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Abstract: 
 
When investment is repeated, previous outcomes (winning/losing) as well as the current 
budget level (gain/loss domain) influence decisions. The first is related to the so-called 
"gamblers fallacy". The second to value function relative to some reference point. Both 
effects have been extensively studied, however not their interaction. 
We present a meta-study of five experiments initially conducted to investigate myopic-loss-
aversion. We observe that investment is related to the number of previous winning rounds as 
well as to the current budget position relative to a reference point. These effects persist when 
the analysis is extended to settings with restricted flexibility concerning investment.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Most outcomes are not evaluated in absolute terms, but with respect to our expectations. 
While an unexpected gain of a small price might increase our happiness enormously (Schwarz 
and Strack, 1999), receiving the same small price might lead to anger and frustration when 
expectations were high. This holds for outcomes from gambles and investment, but equally 
for salaries (Kirchsteiger, 1994) and negotiation results (Gimpel, 2007). What creates and 
defines expectations is so far little understood by economists. Experience, knowledge, 
personality and emotions might all influence expectations concerning outcomes and thus 
reactions to them. The fact that the same outcome will sometimes be evaluated positively 
while in other situations negatively has been modeled by economists with the use of value 
functions including a reference points (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). What defines the 
reference point is however not always clear. It can be seen as a representation of the status 
quo (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) or be modeled by taking into account expectations 
(Kıszegi and Rabin, 2007). A reference point implies that dependent on whether an outcome 
is seen as a relative gain or loss, reactions to the outcome can be crucially different. Since 
expectations can differ, the same outcome might therefore result in very different evaluations. 
Specifically it is generally assumed that losses weight heavier than gains (loss aversion) and 
that risk taking behavior differs between the gain and loss domain.  
In addition to our relative situation also how we got to it will influence its evaluation. 
An unequal bargaining outcome will be accepted if seen as the outcome of a series of unlucky 
events while the same outcome might be refused when considered as being due to the unfair 
behavior of another agent (Kirchsteiger, 1994). In an uncertain environment probabilities will 
be updated based on outcomes and therefore outcomes will influence expectations concerning 
the future. And even if probabilities are fixed and known, biases have been documented 
concerning expectations, for example the "hot hand effect" and the "gamblers fallacy" 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Croson and Sundali, 2005).  
A large literature has focused on loss aversion and at the same time biases concerning 
previous outcomes have been extensively studied. However, so far, the two effects have been 
rarely discussed in combination. Obviously real live decision situations will be characterized 
by the current budget level as well as by the events that lead to this situation. It is therefore 
highly desirable to compare the impact of previous experiences and the current situation on 
choices to determine their relative importance and their interaction.  
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This paper presents a meta-analysis of five different experimental studies that were initially 
design to investigate the effect of aggregate feedback and reduced flexibility on risk taking1 
(cf. myopic loss aversion; Bernartzi and Thaler, 1995; Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 
1997). We use this data to investigate how previous outcomes (i.e. the number of winning or 
losing rounds encountered) and the current budget (i.e. absolute losses or gains relative to a 
natural reference point) influence investment decisions in future periods. We show that small 
gains decrease investment and that larger gains increase investment. For losses we observe the 
opposite pattern. Namely small losses increase investment while larger losses decrease 
investment. This effect is opposite to the "peanuts effect" discussed in the literature and in 
line with the "magnitude effect" (Weber and Chapman, 2005).2 We extend this model to 
account also for the number of previously encountered winning and losing rounds. We 
observe evidence for the gamblers fallacy, namely for the tendency to reduce investment 
when recent gains were frequent. Both effects co-exist and predict behavior very well.  
We then extend our analysis to the data on investment when feedback and flexibility 
are restricted. We observe that even if feedback is restricted the "gamblers fallacy" effect is 
present. Focus shifts from the immediately preceding periods to the total history of gains and 
losses but still a higher number of previous winning rounds predict a decrease in investment. 
Thus reduced feedback does not change probability judgments concerning the future. Also 
reduced feedback does not increase investment when in the loss domain. We rather observe 
the opposite effect, namely a decrease in investment when small losses are encountered. The 
main difference under reduced feedback and flexibility is time. Over rounds investment is 
significantly increasing, independent of experience and current earnings. We will hypothesize 
that this effect must be related to a general increase of optimism and confidence under 
reduced feedback. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we give an overview of 
experimental studies of the value function relative to some reference point and studies 
investigating the impact of previous outcomes on future risk taking. Section 3 presents the 
data used for this study and compares the five different experiments used. Section 4 presents a 
                                                 
1
 The implementation of aggregate feedback and reduced flexibility implies that investment decisions have to be 
fixed for a number of periods in advance (reduced flexibility). Thus subjects fix their investment level for the 
next three periods and receive after the periods have passed information about the outcome (aggregate feedback).  
2
 It should be noted however that assuming probability weighting we cannot conclude from the shape of the 
utility function the actual risk behavior. Thus only assuming expected utility theory, we can say that convexity of 
the utility function implies risk seeking behavior (Abdellaoui et al., 2007). In our case however the probability of 
winning is p=1/3 which should according to experiments on probability weighting be one of the least distorted 
values (e.g. Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000). 
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random effects Tobit regression of repeated investment for the frequent feedback case. This 
model is extended to the reduced feedback case in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. EXPECTATIONS AND EXPERIENCE 
 
Ever since value functions allowing for a reference point were introduced by Markowitz 
(1952) and Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) attempts have been made to define their precise 
shape. This concerns as well the question whether losses are overweighed compared to gains, 
but also the curvature of the function for gains and losses, respectively. The value function by 
Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) predicts risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for looses. 
The function by Markowitz is further characterized by the "peanuts effect" (Prelec and 
Loewenstein, 1991) implying decreasing risk aversion for decreasing monetary amounts in 
the gain domain.  
Experiments investigating the shape of the value function proceed usually by eliciting 
the certainty equivalent for gambles, or the probabilities that make participants indifferent 
between a certain amount and a gamble (Abdellaoui, 2000, 2007). For this approach 
preferences for gambles in either the gain or loss domain relative to the current status-quo are 
considered. This implies that the current state of the world is taken as the reference point and 
the outcome from the gamble, as well as the certain outcome are in either the gain or loss 
domain. A problem with this approach is that it is not clear which value is taken as a reference 
point by participants. It might be the status-quo or it might be the expected earnings from 
participation in the experiment. Hypothetical questions circumvent this problem to a certain 
degree by framing the question such that it is clear what should be taken as the reference point. 
However hypothetical questions might fail to incentivize respondents to state their true 
preferences (Beattie and Loomes, 1997). 
Studies using either hypothetical or real gambles have identified a value function that 
is concave for gains and convex for losses (Abdellaoui et al., 2007), even though results can 
differ dependent on the method used (Hershey and Schoemaker, 1985). Further there is some 
evidence of the peanuts effect, i.e. the fact that risk seeking is more common for low stakes 
gambles (Weber and Chapman, 2005). However in studies investigating inter-temporal 
choices an opposite effect has been observed. When eliciting preferences for payments either 
now or in the future, an earlier time preference has been observed for small scales than for 
larger scales. I.e. given the choice between $10 now, and $20 in one year the immediate 
option might be preferred, indicating that values need to be at least doubled to compensate for 
the delay. However for the choice between $100 now and $200 in one year a switch to the 
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delayed option is often observed (Chapman and Winquist, 1998). When greater willingness to 
wait for an outcome is interpreted as a sign of lower risk aversion, the observed "magnitude 
effect" is therefore exactly opposed to the "peanuts effect".  Whether larger stakes increase or 
decrease risk aversion might therefore depend on the method applied to elicit it (choices 
across gambles or time preferences). Another method to elicit risk aversion under different 
circumstances would be to consider risky choices when the participant is in either the gain or 
loss domain relative to his/her reference point. This implies that first gains or losses have to 
be realized to then observe changes in behavior. This seems to be a much more realistic 
environment, given that most decisions concerning risk are made under circumstances where 
gains or losses lead to the current position.  
A repeated investment environment adds another possible bias to the situation. Not 
only whether the outcome is in the gain or loss domain relative to some reference point might 
influence risk taking, but also the events that lead to this situation. For example a point in the 
gain domain might be the result of a number of consecutive small gains or the result of a large 
gain and some small losses. Prior outcomes clearly influence probability judgments 
concerning the future. However a number of different biases have been documented, which 
makes it difficult to predict the impact on risk taking. For example a series of gains might 
either increase (hot hand effect) or decrease (gamblers fallacy) the willingness to take future 
risk. The two effects can be seen as stemming from different sources. The hot hand effect is 
related to the illusion of control (Langer, 1975). That is a player or "hand" is considered to be 
in a hot state, promising future gains. The gamblers fallacy is due to the "representativeness 
bias" or the "law of small numbers" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). This leads to the 
expectation that the probability of an event should be reflected in a proportional 
representation of the possible outcomes on all scales.  
Many "mistakes" observed in trading environments are related to one or more of the 
effects discussed so far. Shefrin and Statman (1985) coined the term disposition effect "as 
shorthand for the predisposition toward get-evenitis". This effect describes the tendency to 
hold losing stocks too long and to sell winning stocks too early. An opposed observation 
concerns the house money effect, i.e. the tendency to take risk with the "house money" that 
was gained in previous periods. This tendency to become more risk seeking after gains has 
been observed for sequential gambles (Thaler and Johnson, 1990) as well as for market 
experiments (Gneezy et al., 2003). Whether outcomes are perceived as gains or losses will 
further depend on the bracketing of income streams. Narrow bracketing will lead to an 
appreciation of each gain or loss as such. Wide bracketing, that is the aggregation of multiple 
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events, will make it easier to observe the expected value and will thus enhance expected value 
maximizing behavior. When the gamble has an expected value larger than its alternative, 
bracketing will therefore increase risk taking (myopic loss aversion). However when the 
gamble has an expected value that is smaller, bracketing will decrease risk taking (Haisley et 
al., 2008; Read et al., 1999). In general, previous gains and losses should have less of an 
impact on behavior when bracketing is wide. A number of experiments have been exploring 
this issue, known as myopic loss aversion (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 1997; 
Bellmare et al., 2005). These experiments observe higher investment in a risky option when 
feedback is given on an aggregate level after a certain number of rounds. However it is still 
largely unclear whether this effect is due to altered expectations caused by the different kinds 
of feedback, to reduced flexibility3 or to a change in reactions to the same kind of outcomes 
since losses are now less directly experienced. Indeed it might be possible that bracketing will 
not influence the misjudgment of future probabilities ("hot hand effect" or "gamblers fallacy") 
but that due to the restriction of flexibility and the reduction of loss experiences, optimism 
and confidence are increased.  
To explore these issues empirically we need observations of repeated risk taking 
choices where gains and losses relative to some reference level as well as the number of 
previous winning or losing rounds is known. Behavior in such an environment can then be 
analyzed as a dynamic environment. We collected data from five different experiments that 
have been conducted to investigate myopic loss aversion and the impact of flexibility and 
feedback on investment. This data pool offers us repeated investment choices from more than 
400 participants in the two feedback treatments of the simple investment game proposed by 
Gneezy and Potters (1997). Even though this game has been repeatedly replicated, the 
dynamics of behavior have so far been largely ignored. An exception are Fellner and Sutter 
(2009) that study the dynamics in their data, however mainly focusing on treatment effects 
across feedback and flexibility conditions. The fact that the investment game has been 
repeatedly replicated applying identical parameters and instructions, enables us to combine 
results from these study to a meta-analysis investigating risk taking dynamics.4 Even though 
each studies' focus was on another kind of treatment variation, in each study a treatment 
                                                 
3
 Flexibility has been experimentally explored by Bellemare et al. (2005), Langer and Weber (2008) and Fellner 
and Sutter (2009). While results are mixed it seems that a treatment allowing for feedback but reducing 
flexibility has similar consequences as a treatment reducing feedback and flexibility.  
4
 It should be noted that parts of this data collection have been already used for other studies. Charness and 
Gneezy (2007) used observations from a number of investment games to investigate gender effects on risk taking 
behavior. Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006) used combined data from multiple investment studies to investigate 
whether myopic loss aversion or non-linear probability weighting is responsible for the observed effects.  
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allowing for frequent feedback and full flexibility and a treatment with reduced feedback and 
flexibility were present. 
 
3. DATA 
 
Data was collected from five different experiments that used the investment task proposed by 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) to investigate myopic loss aversion.5 Each experiment compared 
different treatments concerning investment feedback and flexibility. However common to all 
experiments that were used for the analysis is that they included a high feedback treatment 
and a low feedback treatment. In the first part of our analysis we will solely concentrate on 
results from the high feedback treatment since it allows us to observe investment in a repeated 
investment task where investors had information about outcomes after every round. In section 
4.3 we will then compare how predictions of investment behavior for the high feedback 
treatment compared to the low feedback treatment. 
The investment task proposed to participants used the same probabilities and relative 
payoffs in all of the included studies. Participants had to decide how to distribute y points 
between a safe and a risky project. Points that were invested in the safe project were kept for 
sure. Points invested in the risky project had a 1/3 probability to be multiplied by 3.5 and a 
probability of 2/3 to be lost. Thus the expected value from the safe project was one point per 
invested point, while the expected value from the risky project was 1.17. Note that previous 
earnings could not be used for future investment. Thus in each round participant received a 
new endowment of y for investment.6  The maximum amount y therefore stayed constant 
across all rounds of a study. Across the experiments we have slight variations in how many 
points (y) participants had in each round available and whether investment was done with 
points that were later exchanged into a monetary currency or directly with money. However 
accounting for the differences of when studies were conducted and exchange rates, we see 
that stakes for one round of investment were between 50 and 100 euro cents. Differences 
concerning the experiments are summarized in Table 1. Investment was repeated n times. 
Across studies we have a variation of minimal 9 and maximal 18 periods of repeated 
investment. In all studies treatment High (high frequency feedback) consisted of n repetitions 
of the same investment choice with immediate feedback about the outcome from investment  
                                                 
5
 To keep as many aspects of the investment situation constant we therefore do not include data from other 
experiments also investigating myopic loss aversion. Problematic variations include different probabilities and 
payoff and the possibility to use accumulated earnings for future investment (e.g. Thaler et al., 1997; Lange and 
Weber, 2008).  
6
 This can be seen as a situation with a continuous income stream that is used for investment. 
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Table I: Overview of included studies 
 Country (town) 
& method 
observations 
High 
observations 
Low 
rounds 
 
max amount 
BK:  
Bellmare et 
al., (2005)  
Netherlands 
(Tilburg); 
computer 
44 students 44 students 9 70 euro cents 
FS:  
Fellner and 
Sutter, (2009)  
Germany 
(Jena); 
computer 
30 students 30 students 18 100 points    
(= 50 euro 
cents) 
GP:  
Gneezy and 
Potters (1997) 
Netherlands 
(Tilburg); 
paper and 
pencil 
41 students 42 students 9  200 dutch 
guilder cents 
(≈ 90 euro 
cents) 
HL:  
Haigh and 
List (2005) 
US (University 
of Maryland); 
paper and 
pencil 
32 students; 
27 traders 
 
= 59 total 
 
32 students; 
27 traders 
 
= 59 total 
 
9 100 units      
(= 100 US 
cents for 
students ≈ 80 
euro cents; 
traders: x4) 
HW: 
Hopfensitz 
and Wranik 
(2008) 
Switzerland 
(Geneva); 
computer 
38 students 39 students 15 100 units      
(= 133 CHF 
cents ≈ 90 
euro cents) 
  total: 212 total: 214   
 
and the possibility to adjust investment. Treatment Low (low frequency feedback) restricted 
the flexibility and feedback frequency of outcomes. For this treatment investment was always 
to be fixed for three consecutive rounds. I.e. a choice only had to be made in rounds 1, 4, 7, ... 
Note that resolution of outcomes slightly varied across studies. Two studies (GP and HL) 
were conducted with paper and pencil and outcomes were resolved by picking a winning 
letter (respectively color) for each round. Outcomes across participants were therefore 
correlated during a session. For the other three studies the task was computerized and 
outcomes were announced to participants based on computerized random series. Outcomes 
during a session were therefore not necessarily correlated. Another difference concerns the 
study by HW that asked participants every three rounds to answer to a short psychological 
questionnaire.  
Participants in the five included studies were mostly students from Universities in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and the US. 7  Haigh and List (2005) combines 
observations from professional traders and students. Each study contains an almost equal 
number of observations for treatments High and Low. Overall we have 212 observations for 
treatment High and 214 observations for treatment Low. To make investment behavior 
                                                 
7
 Unfortunately not all studies report gender of the participants. We therefore do not include it in our analysis. 
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comparable across studies we normalize full investment to one. Thus a participant putting all 
his available points in a round in the risky project will have invested one unit of normalized 
investment. Normalized investment at time t (yt) is thus a percentage of the maximal amount 
of points available for investment. Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of choices and the 
calculation of the current earnings at time t (Et) and the amount that could have been earned 
with solely safe investment up to time t-1 (Yt). 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
 
We start our analysis with a quick recapitulation of aggregate investment results for the 
different studies. We then turn to an analysis of whether we observe differences in risk taking 
when earnings are in either the gain or loss domain. This model is then extended to also 
account for the events that lead to current relative income, namely the number of previous 
winning rounds. In a second step we compare this model for treatments High and Low. 
 
4.1. AGGREGATE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR ACROSS STUDIES 
 
Investment behavior across studies and rounds is summarized in Figure 2. Since the studies 
were mainly interested in comparing investment behavior across feedback treatments, mainly 
aggregate investment behavior over blocks of three rounds is presented in the original papers. 
The detailed investment pattern shows some variation; however we observe no clear time 
trend or pattern across studies. Across studies we observe quite some variability in investment 
1 1
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
y11 - y1
riskysafe
3.5 y11 - y1 0
p = 1/3(1-p) = 2/3
E2 = 1 + 2.5 y1
Y2 = 1
y21 – y2
riskysafe
3.5 y21 – y2 0
p = 1/3(1-p) = 2/3
E3 = (1 + 2.5 y1) + (1 - y2)
Y3 = 2
…
gain loss
 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of events and calculation of current earnings (Et) and the reference point (Yt) 
after a period where the risky project resulted in gains; and where the risky project resulted in 
losses. 
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amount. BK report on average the highest amounts of investment (mean: 59%) and the lowest 
is reported by FS (mean: 33%). 
Since our main interest concerns the impact of relative gains or losses on future 
decisions we present relative earnings across rounds in Figure 3. Since points invested in the 
safe project could be kept with certainty, we take as the reference point of time t, the amount 
that would have been earned up to that point with solely safe investment.8 Therefore at time 
t=2 one unit of normalized investment would have been earned by a participant that invested 
all his money in the safe option. A participant investing all his points in the risky option 
would either have received a gain or a loss. In the case of a loss he would have therefore 
earned 0 units at time t=2, which we will classify as a loss of one normalized unit. In case of a 
gain he would have earned 3.5 units at time t=2, which will be classified as a gain of 2.5. 
Therefore at time t a participant only investing in the safe project would have ensured a gain 
of (t-1) normalized units (Yt). Any positive or negative deviation of current earnings (Et) from 
this amount will be classified as either a gain or a loss. Figure 3:A presents mean relative 
earnings across rounds. As we see over time mean earnings increase. However we observe a 
large variance of individual earnings as is illustrated by a box and whisker plot in Figure 3:B9. 
We see that across rounds and treatments about half of the observations lie in a range from 
losses of approximately 1.5 to gains of 2. We therefore have quite some variability in whether 
decisions were taken in either the loss or gain domain. 
 
                                                 
8
 Certainly we cannot be sure that participants took indeed the possible earnings from the safe option as their 
reference point. As noted earlier, participants might have general expectations concerning their earnings from the 
study. However in the presented studies the instructions made explicit that an amount was given to participants 
which could be used to bet in a lottery. Bets could then result in either losses or gains. We therefore think that 
our assumption that the gains from the safe option are the reference point for most participants is substantive. 
9
 Box indicating 25th percentile to 75th percentile. Whiskers from lower adjacent value to upper adjacent value. 
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Figure 2: Investment behavior across rounds for treatment High 
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4.2. INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR WITH FREQUENT FEEDBACK 
 
We will now turn to a discussion of whether a decision being made while in either the gain or 
loss domain will influence the investment level. In Table 2, column 1 we present results from 
a random effects Tobit regression of investment at time t on relative earnings. We include 
gains and losses separately to account for possible differences.10 A comparison across studies 
shows that with respect to our reference study by Gneezy and Potters (GP) only Fellner and 
Sutter (FS) report a significantly different investment level. We also observe a positive time 
trend of investment. Naturally investment in an investment environment will be strongly 
influenced by personality characteristics concerning risk-aversion, anxiety and the like. We 
will take first round investment as a proxy of general risk aversion. Investment in similar 
simple (non-repeated) investment situations has been previously used as a measure of risk 
aversion (e.g. Charness and Gneezy, 2003). We observe that indeed first round investment is 
highly predictive of later investment. 
Deviations from the reference point are considered separately for gains and losses. 
Relative gains and losses and their square are all highly significant at a 1% level. When 
current earnings (Et) are lower than the reference point Yt, we first observe an increase in 
investment, however due to a negative sign of the square of losses investment eventually 
decreases. By contrast gains lead initially to a decrease in investment which due to a positive 
sign of its square will eventually increase again. For losses the switch from an increase to a 
 
                                                 
10
 To make comparisons with later results possible, observations are restricted to time points t > 3. This 
restriction has no noticeable effect on the presented regression results. 
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Figure 3: Relative earnings at time t for treatment High (i.e. difference between current 
earnings and earnings if up to point t-1 all points had been invested in the safe project) (A) 
mean split over study (B) box and whisker plot grouping all five studies. 
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Table II: Random effects Tobit regression of investment at time t (treatment High) 
 (1) marginal  (2) marginal 
 invest(t) effect  invest(t) effect 
investmenet at t=1 1.004 1.004  0.971 0.971 
 (11.27)***   (11.07)***  
Losses i.e. |Et – Yt| if Et ≤ Yt 0.121 0.121  0.089 0.089 
 (5.04)***   (3.53)***  
Losses squared -0.021 -0.021  -0.017 -0.017 
 (5.31)***   (4.34)***  
Gains i.e. |Et – Yt| if Et ≥ Yt -0.112 -0.112  -0.080 -0.080 
 (5.91)***   (3.89)***  
Gains squared  0.012 0.012  0.009 0.009 
 (4.40)***   (3.45)***  
Time 0.015 0.015  0.008 0.008 
 (5.11)***   (1.31)  
dummy_BK 0.086 0.086  0.092 0.092 
 (1.09)   (1.17)  
dummy_FS -0.160 -0.160  -0.147 -0.147 
 (1.81)*   (1.71)*  
dummy_HL 0.021 0.021  0.018 0.018 
 (0.28)   (0.24)  
dummy_HW -0.055 -0.055  -0.063 -0.063 
 (0.70)   (0.78)  
win(t-1)    -0.133 -0.133 
    (6.80)***  
win(t-2)    -0.077 -0.077 
    (3.94)***  
win(t-3)    -0.022 -0.022 
    (1.14)  
win(1 to t-1)    0.014 0.014 
    (0.82)  
Constant 0.029   0.120  
 (0.40)   (1.63)  
Observations 1770   1770  
Number of participants 212   212  
Log likelihood -981.879   -953.528  
Wald Chi^2 243.09 (df=10)   305.30 (df=14)  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
decrease in investment, happens at an absolute deviation of approximately 5 units from the 
reference point (cf. also Figure 3, on relative earnings). For gains the switch from a decrease 
to an increase in investment happens approximately at an 8 unit deviation from the reference 
point.11 We therefore conclude that aggregated gains or losses up to a certain point in time 
significantly influence investment choices. For small deviations, losses lead to an increase and 
gains to a decrease in investment. However both effects get reversed when deviations become 
larger.  
In column 2 we extend this model to also account for the number of previous winning 
rounds. We introduce dummies for winning in the last (t-1), second to last (t-2) and third to 
                                                 
11
 These values should however be taken as rough approximations given that only 5% of our observations lie 
below or above these limits. 
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last (t-3) period before the investment decision is taken. We also introduce a variable 
representing the total number of winning rounds encountered up to that point (win(1 to t-1)). 
We observe that the coefficients of the variables of model (1) concerning study dummies, first 
round investment and relative earnings, stay largely unchanged. However the previously 
highly significant time trend is no longer observed. Instead we see that having recently 
experienced a winning round significantly decreases investment in the risky project.  
This is not only true for the last but also for the second to last round. However the 
coefficient is approximately halved from time (t-1) to (t-2). We therefore observe evidence of 
the gamblers fallacy and a decreasing importance of outcomes that happened further in the 
past. This effect coexists with the observed effects on risk taking dependent on whether the 
current balance is in either the gain or loss domain. We illustrate this interaction for small and 
positive total earnings in Figure 4. In general we observed a reduction in risk taking for small 
gains which is later inversed. Thus we can model this by a utility function which is concave 
for small gains. However having recently experienced winning rounds will further decrease 
the amount invested. Since recent winning rounds imply that total earnings at t-1 were lower 
than current total earnings we know that in this case Et-1 ≤ Et. Since we are considering a case 
where Et is a relatively small gain it is likely that Et-1 was even in the loss domain. Thus the 
further decrease in risk taken is due to participants that just managed due to a lucky outcome 
to leave the loss domain and enter the gain domain. Not wanting to risk this recent gain (and 
fearing a return into the loss domain) thus leads to a reduction in investment. The opposite is 
true for participants that arrive at Et following a loss. Logically for them Et-1 must have been 
larger or equal to Et. Thus here we have participants that had significant earnings and lost 
some of them recently. Due to the previous positive experience they invest comparatively 
more than those coming from the loss domain. 
We have thus in a way identified multiple reference points that influence decisions at 
the same time. Not only how current earnings are positioned relative to a reference point but 
also how previous earnings were positioned will influence behavior. 
 
RESULT 1: Investment in a repeated environment is influenced at the same time by previous 
wins and by earnings relative to a reference point. Previous wins reduce investment, we thus 
observe evidence of the "gamblers fallacy". Small absolute gains reduce investment and small 
losses increase investment. However this effect gets reversed for larger gains and losses due 
to an opposite coefficient of the square of gains and losses. 
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4.3. INVESTMENT DYNAMICS WITH EITHER FREQUENT OR INFREQUENT 
FEEDBACK 
After having identified the dynamics of risk taking in a n times repeated investment task, we 
will now extend our analysis to the observations from the treatments with reduced feedback 
and flexibility. In these treatments, investment decisions had to be fixed for three consecutive 
periods. That is dependent on the total number of rounds played, investment decisions were 
made in rounds t = 1 + 3x (for x  [0, 5]). The investment decision was fixed for the following 
three rounds and participants observed after this period their aggregate gains from the last 
three rounds. To extend our analysis to these treatments we therefore have to consider the 
reduced set of measures from these rounds t = 1 + 3x. Over all studies we therefore have 
between two and five repeated observations per participant. Figure 5 presents summary 
statistics concerning relative earnings and their distribution for treatment Low. We can see 
that mean earnings over all studies and rounds are positive, however there is significant 
variance concerning earnings throughout the data set. As for treatment High we observe that 
about half of the observations fall in a range from losses of approximately 1.5 normalized 
units to gains of 2 units.  
 
Yt EtEt-1 Et-1 earnings
U(.)
gain loss
 
 
Figure 4: An illustration of the impact of previous outcome (gain versus loss) given the same level 
of current earnings (Et). For small amounts in the gain domain we observe risk aversion. Even less 
risk is taken when a gain was previously experienced; which implies that Et-1 was lying to the left 
of Et (doted line). Relatively more risk is taken when Et-1 was lying to the right of Et (dashed line). 
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Table III presents results of a random effects Tobit regression for treatments High and Low 
for the reduced set of observations. We replicate the results presented in section 4.2 for the 
reduced data set in column 1. Note that the reduced set of time points also requires a grouping 
of previous winning rounds into one variable. We replace the dummy variable for a winning 
round at times t-1, t-2 and t-3, with the count of winning rounds in the last three rounds 
preceding the decision. The effect of investment in the first round and the treatment dummies 
is almost unchanged. Effect size and significance of relative earnings and the number of 
winning rounds previously encountered is reduced but still observable.  
We apply now the same model to observations from the treatments with Low feedback 
and flexibility (Table III: column 2). Again we observe that our proxy for risk aversion 
(investment at t=1) is highly significant and strongly predictive of later behavior. We observe 
no significant differences across the different included studies. The effect of relative earnings 
is however affected by the reduction of feedback and flexibility. We observe the same 
tendency for relative gains (even though the coefficients for gains fail to reach significance). 
However when the current balance is in the loss domain we now observe a significant 
reduction in investment for small values. This negative coefficient is cancelled out due to a 
significant positive impact of squared losses. Thus small absolute losses under reduced 
feedback reduce investment, while large deviations might increase investment. 
It is interesting to note that the earlier observed "gamblers fallacy" is still apparent. 
Even though only aggregate information about gains from the last three rounds was given in 
the Low feedback treatment, the number of winning rounds from the last block of rounds was  
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Figure 5: Relative earnings at time t for treatment Low (i.e. deviation from amount earned 
if up to point t-1 all points had been invested in the safe project) (A) mean split over study 
(B) box and whisker plot grouping all five studies 
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Table III: Random effects Tobit regression of investment at time t (t = 4, 7, 10, 13, 16) for 
treatment High and Low 
 (1) treatment 
High 
marginal 
effect 
 (2) treatment 
Low 
marginal 
effect 
 invest(t)   invest(t)  
investment at t=1 0.911 0.911  1.078 1.078 
 (9.05)***   (13.59)***  
Losses i.e. |Et – Yt| if Et ≤ Yt 0.075 0.075  -0.096 -0.096 
 (1.89)*   (2.58)**  
Losses squared -0.010 -0.010  0.017 0.017 
 (1.69)*   (1.67)*  
Gains i.e. |Et – Yt| if E ≥ Yt -0.058 -0.058  -0.014 -0.014 
 (1.59)   (0.64)  
Gains squared 0.013 0.013  0.003 0.003 
 (2.42)**   (1.41)  
Time -0.002 -0.002  0.026 0.026 
 (0.17)   (2.94)***  
dummy_BK -0.003 -0.003  0.071 0.071 
 (0.03)   (1.13)  
dummy_FS -0.183 -0.183  -0.024 -0.024 
 (2.02)**   (0.36)  
dummy_HL -0.022 -0.022  0.071 0.071 
 (0.28)   (1.19)  
dummy_HW 0.022 0.022  -0.089 -0.089 
 (0.26)   (1.43)  
win(t-3 to t-1) -0.080 -0.080  -0.032 -0.032 
 (3.40)***   (1.90)*  
win(1 to t-1) 0.006 0.006  -0.051 -0.051 
 (0.25)   (1.85)*  
Constant 0.207   0.112  
 (2.52)**   (1.65)*  
Observations 590   596  
Number of participants 212   214  
Log likelihood -336.918   -147.526  
Wald Chi^2 164.20 (df=12)   250.50 (df=12)  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
easily deducible for participants.12 Only the order of events was not revealed. The impact of 
the number of previous winning rounds is now not exclusively restricted to the last three 
rounds preceding the decision but to all previous rounds. That is more wins in the last three 
rounds and more overall wins in the game so far reduce investment. Indeed we observe that 
the magnitude of the joint coefficient of these two variables is very close to the coefficient of 
wins in the last three rounds in treatment High. 
Our final observation concerns the highly significant and positive time trend for 
reduced feedback and flexibility. This time trend implies increased investment independent of 
the number of previous winning rounds and of the current earnings. This effect seems 
surprising but might be related to a general increase in confidence and optimism observed for 
situations of reduced flexibility (Hopfensitz and Wranik, 2008). While winning and losing 
                                                 
12
 In some of the studies outcomes were even explicitly shown, however without indicating their order.  
17 
 
still influences risk taking and even though absolute losses now lead to more risk averse 
decisions, the overall experience from reduced flexibility and feedback seems to increase 
confidence in the risky option over time.  
 
RESULT 2: When feedback and flexibility are reduced we still observe an impact of previous 
wins (gamblers fallacy). Also deviations from the reference point are still influential; however 
the effects are less pronounced and inversed for losses. That is small losses now reduce 
investment. The main difference between treatments High and Low is a significantly positive 
time trend under low feedback and flexibility. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we presented a meta-study of five repeated investment experiments to investigate 
the relative importance of either previous events (winning or losing) or relative earnings (loss 
aversion) on decisions taken. A large literature has previously investigated whether risk taking 
behavior differs in the gain versus the loss domain and whether previous wins increase or 
decrease future risk taking. The two effects can however be independent. Gains relative to an 
initial reference point can be due to a large gain followed by some small losses or by a 
number of small gains. Thus it is possible that both effects coexist and influence behavior 
jointly. Indeed we can show for our sample of 200 participants from five different studies, that 
the relative position to the reference point is highly predictive of behavior. When participants 
are in the gain domain they reduce investment. When they are in the loss domain they 
increase investment. However due to a significantly positive effect of the squared of gains as 
well as losses this effect is cancelled out when gain or losses get larger. In addition we 
observe that participants display signs of the "gamblers fallacy". Having won in the last or 
second to last round significantly decreases the amount invested. We can therefore show that 
the two effects co-exist and are two independent behavioral biases. 
When we extend the same analysis to observations from treatments where feedback 
and flexibility were restricted we observe that previous events and relative earnings both keep 
playing a significant role. However the effect of gains is weaker and the effect of losses is 
even inversed. This implies that small losses now lead to a decrease in investment while for 
larger losses investment will increase again. What is interesting is the fact that the gamblers 
fallacy is still strongly present. Thus even though detailed information about individual gains 
and losses was not available, the number of previous winning round and the total number of 
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winning rounds encountered significantly influence risk taking. The higher the number of 
previous winning rounds the more investment gets reduced. The largest difference between 
the model of frequent and reduced feedback concerns a highly significant time trend in 
treatment Low. This effect might be related to differences in experienced emotions and 
evaluations due to reduced feedback. Previous experimental research has shown that in 
dynamic investment settings anticipated and experienced emotions (Hopfensitz and van 
Winden, 2008) and evaluations concerning the future (Hopfensitz and Wranik, 2008) 
influence choices. Given that loss aversion is based on the assumption that "losses loom larger 
than gains" it is to be expected that reduced feedback will reduce the experience of negative 
emotions and increase optimistic evaluations concerning the future. Thus the significantly 
positive time trend might can be seen as a representation of increased confidence in the future 
and decreased fear of negative experiences. What is interesting is that this effect is 
independent from the actual number of gains and the relative income position. The effect of 
myopic loss aversion seems therefore to develop over time and not be anticipated ex-ante. 
This might have important implications for when and where myopic loss aversion is going to 
be observed. 
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APPENDIX A: METHODS OVERVIEW 
 
In the following we cite from the method sections of the five included studies. 
 
Gneezy and Potters (1997): 
 
In the experiment, subjects were confronted with a sequence of twelve identical but 
independent rounds of a lottery (betting game). In each of the first nine rounds [...], subjects 
were endowed with 200 cents. They had to decide which part (Xt) of this endowment they 
wanted to bet in the lottery. In the lottery there was a probability of 2/3 of losing the amount 
bet and a probability of 1/3 of winning two and a half times the amount bet. Subjects were 
fully informed about the objective probabilities of winning and losing, and about the 
corresponding size of gains and losses. It is important to stress that subjects could not bet any 
money accumulated in previous rounds. Hence, the maximum bet in each round is 200 cents, 
independently of the outcome of the bet in any of the previous rounds.  
[...] The crucial feature of the design is that there were two different treatments: 
Treatment H (high frequency) and Treatment L (low frequency). In Treatment H the subjects 
played the rounds one by one. At the beginning of round 1 they had to choose how much of 
their endowment of 200 cents to bet in the lottery. Then they were informed about the 
realization of the lottery in round 1. Only then could they decide how much of their new 
endowment of 200 cents to bet for round 2, and so on. Hence, in this treatment subjects made 
nine betting decisions [...]. In Treatment L, however, subjects played the rounds in blocks of 
three. At the beginning of round 1, subjects had to decide how much of their endowment of 
200 cents to bet in the lotteries of rounds 1, 2, and 3. In addition, these bets were restricted to 
be equal. If a subject bet X in round 1, (s)he also bet X in rounds 2 and 3. 
 
Bellemare et al (2005): 
 
Participants were confronted with a sequence of nine independent draws of the same gamble. 
For each draw an individual received an endowment of 70 Eurocents, which could be totally 
or partially invested. In the gamble, there was a probability of 1/3 of winning two and a half 
times the amount bet. With probability 2/3 the amount would be lost entirely. Subjects were 
fully informed about the objective probabilities of winning and losing, and about the 
corresponding size of gains and losses. It is important to stress that subjects could not bet any 
money accumulated in previous rounds. Hence, the maximum bet in each round was 70 
Eurocents, independently of the outcome of the bet in any of the previous rounds. First, we 
replicated the GP treatments H (high frequency information/high flexibility) and L (low 
frequency information/low flexibility) in order to provide a basis for comparison. In treatment 
H the subjects played the gambles one by one. At the beginning of round one they had to 
choose how much of their endowment of 70 Eurocents to bet in the lottery. Then they were 
informed about the realization of the lottery in round one. Only then they could decide how 
much of their new endowment of 70 Eurocents to bet in round two, and so on. Hence, in this 
treatment subjects made nine subsequent betting decisions. 
In treatment L, on the other hand, subjects played the nine rounds in blocks of three. 
At the beginning of round one, subjects had to decide how much of their endowment of 70 
Eurocents to bet in the lotteries of rounds one, two, and three. In addition, these bets were 
restricted to be equal. If a subject bet X in round one, she also bet X in rounds two and three. 
After subjects decided on their bets, they were informed about the realizations for rounds one, 
two, and three at the same time. Subsequently, subjects decided how much to bet in rounds 
four, five, and six, and so on. [...] 
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We ran a computerized experiment with a total of twelve sessions in September 2003. 
Participants were recruited via email from the subject pool of the CentER lab at Tilburg 
University comprising 500 people at the time of recruitment. The invitation announced a 
decision-making experiment that would last no longer than 40 min, with a reward that would 
depend on their decisions. The experiment was held in the CentER lab, where students were 
seated in separated compartments.  
 
Haigh and List (2005): 
 
We used a straightforward 2 × 2 experimental design. [...] Using a between-person 
experimental design, we included both undergraduate students and professional traders in two 
distinct treatments: Treatment F (denoting frequent feedback) and Treatment I (denoting 
infrequent feedback). And to ensure comparability with the extant literature, we followed 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) when crafting our experimental protocol and parameters. [...] In 
Treatment F, subjects were confronted with a sequence of nine rounds in which they were 
endowed with 100 units per round [...]. In each of the nine rounds, the subject decided what 
portion of this endowment (0, 100) she desired to bet in a lottery that returned two-and-a-half 
times the bet with one-third probability and nothing with two-thirds probability. [...] Subjects 
were made aware of the probabilities, payoffs, and the fact that the lottery would be played 
directly after all subjects had made their choices for that round. Thus, subjects played rounds 
one by one. Subjects were therefore aware of the fact that they could earn anywhere between 
0 and 350 units in each round. Finally, subjects were informed that monies earned were to be 
summed and paid in private at the end of the experiment. Contrasting with this “frequent 
feedback” environment is Treatment I, which is identical to Treatment F, except that in 
Treatment I agents placed their bets in blocks of three. Rather than placing their round bet and 
realizing the round outcome before proceeding to the next round, in Treatment I agents 
decided in round t how much of their 100-unit endowment they wished to bet in the lotteries 
for each of three rounds, t, t + 1, and t + 2. Following Gneezy and Potters (1997), we 
restricted the bets to be homogeneous across the three rounds. Most importantly, after subjects 
placed their bets, they were informed about the combined realization of the three rounds.  
[...] We recruited 64 subjects for our student treatments from the undergraduate 
student body at the University of Maryland. Each treatment was run in a large classroom on 
the College Park campus of the University of Maryland. To ensure that decisions remained 
anonymous, the subjects were seated far apart from each other. The trader subject pool 
included 54 professional traders from the CBOT. Each of the trader treatments was run in a 
large room on-site at the CBOT. As in the case of the students, communication between the 
subjects was prohibited and the traders were seated such that no subject could observe another 
individual’s decision (and payoffs). 
 
Fellner and Sutter (2009): 
 
All experimental treatments are variations of the basic investment task of Gneezy and Potters 
(1997). Subjects are endowed with 100 ECU (experimental currency units, with 100 ECU = 
50 Euro-Cents) in each of a total of 18 rounds. They can decide to keep the endowment with 
zero interest or invest any amount X[0, 100] in a risky lottery. If the lottery wins (with 
probability ⅓), subjects win 2.5 times the amount invested (in addition to keeping their initial 
endowment). If the lottery loses (with probability ⅔), the amount invested is lost.  
[...] Subjects were invited for participation by using the recruitment system ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2004), and the sessions were run computerized using the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Each of the treatments was conducted in a separate session, and no 
subject could participate in more than one session.  
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Hopfensitz and Wranik (2009): 
 
To allow comparison with earlier results, our experiment is based on the research designs by 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Bellemare et al. (2005). In the baseline treatment, participants 
faced 15 consecutive investment rounds.  Participants received 100 points for each round, 
which could be fully or partially invested into one of two choices. Earnings from previous 
rounds could not be used for future investment.  One of the two investment choices was safe 
(i.e., every point invested would be added to the final earnings), and the other choice was 
risky. The risky choice returned the invested points multiplied by 3.5 with p=1/3, and returned 
nothing in 2/3 of the cases. Thus, participants could either earn 2.5 times their investment 
(relative to the points they had received at the beginning of the round) or lose their investment. 
To make losses salient, the instructions and computer interface clearly stated that participants 
had an initial amount of capital which they could either keep or invest. The expected value of 
the risky choice was therefore larger than the expected value of the safe choice.  
[...] In the baseline treatment, participants had to make a new investment decision in 
each round and received investment performance feedback after each round. We therefore call 
this treatment High (short for “high feedback”). In contrast, participants in the Low treatment 
(“low feedback”) were required to fix their investment choice for three consecutive rounds 
and received aggregate feedback about their returns from these three rounds. [...] 
Since the aim of our study is to identify individual differences, evaluations, and 
emotions underlying myopic loss aversion, we asked participants to respond to questionnaires 
before and during the task. [...] During the experimental session, we measured baseline 
evaluations and emotions before the first investment round. Then, every three rounds, after 
receiving feedback concerning their investment, subjects were asked to: (1) indicate and rate 
the most prominent emotion they experienced; (2) answer a number of questions concerning 
evaluations of past and future rounds. 
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